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THE PSYCHOLOGIST IN TODAY'S LEGAL
WORLD: PART H
DAViD W LOUISELL*
CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS**
The practice of psychology has come of age m American society'
during an era when legal scholars are prone to deprecate the so-
cial and moral worth of the historic privileges of confidential corn-
*Professor of Law, Umversity of California, Berkeley. Member, Minne-
sota, New York and District of Columbia Bars. The author wishes to express
hIs appreciation to Mr. Donald M. Cahen for a critical reading of this paper.
**This is the second in a series of articles on The Psychologist in Today's
Legal World, commenced by the author in 39 Minn. L. Rev. 236 (1955) with
a discussion of "The Psychologist as an Expert Witness." In that discussion
the author assumed familiarity of the reader with the distinction between a
psycluatrist and a psychologist, but since then it has become apparent to
him from correspondence and otherwise that many persons outside the psy-
chatric and psychologic professions do not have the distinction clearly in
mind. See Huston, A Psychiatrist's Observation on the Orientation of
Clinical Psychology, in Psychology, Psychiatry, and the Public Interest 28,
30 (Krout ed. 1956), Schwartz, Is There a Need for Psychology i Py-
chotherapy? in id. at 113, 128. See Havemann, The Age of Psychology ti the
U.S., Life, Jan. 7, 1957, p. 68, where psychological and psycluatric practices
are mentioned together without delineation or definition. A psychiatrist is a
specialist in psychiatry, "the medical specialty that deals with mental dis-
orders, esp[ecially] with the psychoses, but also with the neuroses." Webster,
New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1947). A psychologist is one versed in
psychology, "the science which treats of the mind in any of its aspects;
systematic knowledge and investigation of the phenomena of consciousness and
behavior; the study of the organism and its activities, considerng it as an
individual whole, esp[ecially] in relation to its physical and social environ-
ment; "Id. Thus a psychiatrist is a doctor of medicine who after completing
a regular medical course has specialized m psychiatry. The psychologist is a
non-medically trained specialist in psychology, often with a Ph.D., whose
particular specialty within psychology involves performance of one or more
of numerous functions, ranging from industrial psychology (which may
pertain to the conduct of labor relations), to psychodiagnosis and psycho-
therapy, sometimes carried on by a clinical practitioner of psychology. It is
activities of the clinical psychologist as a practitioner of psychodiagnosis and
psychotherapy which most closely comcide with the activities of the psycla-
trist. There would seem to be general consensus among the psychiatric and
psychological professions that (1) people in need of professional psychological
services whose needs involve organic pathology require the competence of the
psychiatrist, and (2) some psychological functions, such as diagnosis by pro-
jective tests, vocational guidance, and corrective-educational procedures are
normally within the competence primarily of the psychologist See Bone,
Psychotherapists, Psychological and M edical, in Krout, op. cit. supra, at 146;
Huston, A Psychtatrist's Observations on the Orientation of Clinical Psy-
chology, in id. at 28, 31, Krout, Cat Psychologists and Psychiatrists Share
Their Responsibility to the Public? in id. at 103, 108, Yacorzynski, The
Functiojs of Psychology ti a Medical Situation, in id. at 60, 71. The inter-
professional issue between psycuatry and psychology seems largely to arise'
over the question of the independent practice by the psychologist of psyclio-
diagnosis and psychotherapy. Relations of Medicne ad Psychology: A State-
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ment by Organized Psychiatry, in id. at 23-24, Kubie, Psychology and Psy-
chiatry, 157 J. Am. Med. Ass n 466 (1955) (calling for a new profession,
one that would stand midway between the clinical psychologist and the
medical psychiatrist of today, whose members would have a doctorate of
medical psychology) , Lindner, W4ho Shall Practice Psychotherapy? in Krout,
op. cit. supra, at 148, 159-60, Shakow, Psychology and Psychiatry , A Dia-
logue, Part II, 19 Am. J. Orthopsychlatry 381 (1949) For an illustration
from recent litigation of the psychiatrist and psychologist functioning to-
gether in a clinical setting, see Iverson v. Frandsen, 237 F.2d 898 (10th Cir.
1956), where a psychologist was held not liable for alleged libel contained in
a psych6logical report because the report was qualifiedly privileged and was
free from actionable malice. The Tennessee law licensing psychologists pro-
vides " The psychologist or psychological examiner who engages in
psychotherapy must establish and maintain effective inter-communicatioi with
a psychologically oriented physician, usually a psychiatrist, to make provision
for the diagnosis and treatment of medical problems by a physician with aii
unlimited license to practice the healing arts in this state. " Teni. Code
Ann. § 63-1108 (1955). Arkansas has a provision substantially the same. Ark.
Stat. Ann. § 72-1506 (Supp. 1955)
1. Note, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 474 (1951), which the author commences
with the accurate observation. "The sale of psychological aid to individuals,
particularly in metropolitan areas, has become a lucrative profession. Tiis
development has resulted in an influx of private practitioners who undertake
to render psychological counseling to the relatively normal, and psycho-
therapy to the emotionally distraught." See Sanford, Psychotherapy and the
American Public, in Krout, op. cit. supra note **, at 3. For a discussion for
the layman of the extent of psychological practice in American society today,
see Havemann, The Age of Psychology in the U.S., Life, Jan. 7, 1957, p. 68,
The Tools Psychologists Invented, Life, Jan. 14, 1957, p. 106, The Psycholo-
gist's Service in Solving Daily Problems, Life, Jan. 21, 1957 p. 84, Unlock-
ing the Mind i Psychoanalysts, Life, Jan. 28, 1957, p. 11h, Where Does
Psychology Go from Here? Life, Feb. 4, 1957, p. 68. That author begins his
series with a typical day for John Jones, American, who shaves with a
razor bought because of an ad approved by an advertising agency's psycholo-
gist; reads in his morning paper two columns of psychological fact and
advice, drives to work guided by road signs painted yellow and black pursuant
to psychological advice, passes the office of the company's psychiatrist avail-
able for consultation (the author does not here delineate psychiatry from
psychology), confers with an industrial psychologist on pending union con-
tract negotiations, reads in the afternoon paper more psychological colunis,
and the news item that his favorite movie actress is taking with her to loca-
tion in Africa her personal psychoanalyst, learns that a public opinion poll by
a psychological research firm has found that his company recently suffered
a marked loss of good will, returns home to find his family disturbed by the
son's conference with a school psychologist relative to repeated impudence
to his teacher; goes to a double feature, one concerned with a mental institu-
tion, the other with a farcical psychoanalyst, and ends the day with a TV
newscast informing of a governmental hassle over expenditures for psycho-
logical warfare. The rapid ascendency of psychological practice in American
society has not always had its counterpart in American judicial administra-
tion. See Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Lazo of Evidence
-the Competency of Witnesses, 37 Yale L.J. 1017, 1027 (1928) (urging psy-
chological testing to ascertain competence of certain witnesses). While some-
times judicial hesitancy may represent only cultural lag, sometimes it pro-
ceeds from a sound skepticism concerning scientific validity of the purposed
technique, e.g., Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1956) (ad-
mission of recording of interview of complainant while under "truth serum,'
for purposes of rehabilitation after impeachment, held error) , see Dession.
Freedman, Donnelly and Redlich, Drug-Induced Revelation and Criminal
Investigation, 62 Yale L.J. 315 (1953) , or because of wise regard for the
essentials of human liberty. See Louisell, The Psychologist ti Today's Legal
World, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 236, 253-56, 258 (1955)
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municaton.2 The "practice of psychology" recently has been defined
by Tennessee and Arkansas as the rendering " to individuals or
to the public for remuneration any service involving the application
of recognized principles, methods and procedures of the science
and profession of psychology, such as interviewing or administering
and interpreting tests of mental abilities, aptitudes, interests and
personality characteristics, for such purposes as psychological evalu-
ation or for educational or vocational selection, guidance or place-
ment, or for such purposes as over-all personality appraisal or
classification, personality counseling, psychotherapy or personality
readjustment."3 More briefly, New York has in effect defined the
practice of psychology as the rendering of services to individuals,
corporations or the public for remuneration by anyone holding him-
self out to the public under the description "psychology" or its
denvatives.4 In view of the current deprecation of the philosophy of
the confidential communication privileges by eminent evidence
scholars, it is noteworthy that all four states known at this writing
to have passed licensure laws for psychologists accord to their clients
the privilege of confidential communication, 5 and two of the sLx
states known to have passed psychologist certification laws have
done likewise.0
2. See McCormick, Evidence § 81, at 165-66 (1954), Chafec, Privileged
Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's
Mouth on the Witness Stand? 52 Yale L.J. 607 (1943), McCormick, Law
and the Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U .L. Rev. 218, 220-21 (1956), Morgan,
Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimoty by Rules of Evi-
dence, 10 U. Ch. L. Rev. 285, 286-92 (1943), Morgan, Some Observations
Concerning a Model Code of Evidence, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 145, 150-54 (1940),
cf. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2285 (3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter cited as Wig-
more). For this author's approach to the philosophy of privileged communica-
tions, see Loisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges i
Federal Court Today, 31 Tul. L. Rev. 101 (1956).
3. Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1107 (1955), Ark. Stat. Ann. § 72-1502 (Supp.
1955). Kentucky's definition of the practice of climcal psychology, Ky. Rev.
Stat Ann. § 319.010 (Baldwin 1955), and Georgia's definition of the practice
of applied psychology, Ga. Code Ann. § 84-3101 (1955), are similar, but omit
"psychotherapy."
4. N.Y. Educ. Law § 7601.
5. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 72-1516 (Supp. 1955), Ga. Code Ann. § 84-3118
(1955), Ky. Rev. Stat Ann. § 319.110 (1955), Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1117
(1955). Kentucky's statute is a hybrid of licensure and certification provisions.
Generally, a certification statute, unlike a licensure statute, "does not at-
tempt to delineate specific fields of professional endeavor which can be entered
only by licensed persons, but it does provide that only those who satisfy certain
nummal educational and experiential requirements may assume specified
titles." Note, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 474, 482 (1951), see Gerty, Holloway and
Mackay, Licensure or Certificationi of Clinical Psychologists, 148 J. Am. Med.
Ass'n 271 (1952).
6. N.Y. Educ. Law § 7611, Wash. Rev. Code § 18.83.110 (1955). The
four states with psychologist certification laws containing no provision for
confidentiality of communications to psychologists are Connecticut, Conn. Gen.
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Further, the six states which by statute have accorded to psy-
chologists' clients the privilege of confidential communication have
given the privilege a status equivalent to that enjoyed by client-
attorney communications. Thereby such states have accorded the
new statutory privilege as broad a scope, and underpinned it with
sanctions at least as significant, as those appurtenant to any of the
common law confidential communication privileges. The New York
statute7 provides (and the other five statutes are identical or sub-
stantially similar) -8
The confidential relations and communications between a
psychologist registered under provisions of this act and his client
are placed on the same basis as those provided by law between
attorney and client, and nothing in this article shall be con-
strued to require any such privileged communications to be
disclosed.
New York's willingness to extend confidentiality to psychologist-
client relations in terms at least as inclusive as that enjoyed by any of
the privileged relations at common law, is perhaps particularly
significant because New York historically has been and currently
is outstanding in its willingness to abide by the philosophy of con-
fidentiality and to effectuate its logical and policy requirements even
in "hard cases." 9
Stat. §§ 4632-4638 (1949) , Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. c. 67, §§ 1-10 (1954)
Minnesota, Minn. Stat. §§ 148.79-148.86 (1955) , Virginia, Va. Code Ann. §§
54-103--54-112 (1950). Montana in its general statute on confidential coni-
munications provides "Any person engaged in teaching psychology in any
school, or who acting as such [sic] is engaged in the study and observation
of child mentality, shall not without the consent of the parent or guardian
of such child being so taught or observed testify in any civil action as to
any information so obtained." Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-701-4(6) (1947)
The psychologists' own evaluation, evidencing painstaking consideration, of
the problem of privilege is contained in American Psychological Association,
Ethical Standards of Psychologists 12-14 (1953).
7 N.Y. Educ. Law § 7611.
8. The statutes of Georgia, Tennessee, Arkansas, Kentucky, and Wash-
ington, cited in notes 5 and 6 siupra.
9. E.g., Meyer v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias, 178 N.Y 63, 70
N.E. 111 (1904), affd, 198 U.S. 508 (1905), People v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y
453, 458-59, 126 N.E.2d 559, 561-62 (1955), a case involving client-attorney
communications, where the court said. "Such statutes and decisional law[pertaining to confidential communications] express a long standing public
policy to encourage uninhibited communication between persons standing
in a relation of confidence and trust, such as husband and wife, confessor
and clergyman, or doctor and patient, attorney and client. In carry-
ing out such policy the statutes are accorded a broad and liberal construc-
tion. To say that the broad protection of such policy is not available to
a defendant when he takes the stand in a criminal case would entail con-
sequences far more detrimental to the interests of society than does rejection
of the evidence that might be disclosed. Any other policy than strict
inviolability, unless expressly waived, would seriously hamper the administra-
tion of justice " People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 138 N.E.2d 799 (1956)
[Vol. 41.731
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American society is therefore confronted with increasing recog-
nition of privilege for client-psychologist relations at a time when the
doctrine of confidentiality for even the established professional com-
munication privileges is under strong attack.10 Professor Chafee,
attempting m 1943 to substantiate his thesis that the patient-physi-
cian privilege obstructs justice, was able to state. "There is no
privilege for communications to unlicensed practitioners. And
those psychoanalysts who have been too busy to study medicine
must have spicier facts to relate than physicians, but no court has
yet bound them to secrecy."' 1 But since then a court in Illinois,
which has no statute recognizing a patient-physician privilege and
where presumably the common law rule refusing to recognize such
a privilege prevails, nevertheless spelled out a privilege for the pa-
tient of a psychotherapist, carefully distinguishing that relationship
from the conventional patient-physician relationship.1  Whether the
legislatures currently convened will add to the growing list of states
according privilege to client-psychologist communications is not
known;13 but the fact that within the last decade sLx states have
put themselves on that list would seem to make an affirmative pre-
diction reasonable.
How is the cumulating growth of this new privilege to be ap-
praised? Does it represent a felt social need for confidentiality in
relationships that are multiplying in frequency and doubtless also in
10. See note 2 supra. At least nine states have enacted a client-account-
ant privilege, and at least twelve have enacted a privilege for journalists to
withhold their sources of information. See McCorrmck, Evidence § 81 nnm 4
& 5 (1954), Vanderbilt, Mimmum Standards of Judicial Administration 344-
46 (1949), 8 Wigmore § 2286 nn. 13 & 14. For analyses of the journalists
privilege, see Notes, 35 Neb. L. Rev. 562 (1956), 36 Va. L. Rev. 61 (1950).
11. Chafee, Privileged Coin mumcations: Is Justice Served or Ob-
structed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand? 52 Yale L.J.
607, 611 (1943).
12. Binder v. Ruvell, Civil Docket 52C2535, Circuit Court Cook County,
Ill. (1952), discussed in Guttmacher and Weihofen, Prwileged Communica-
twns Between Psychiatrist and Patient, 28 Ind. L.J. 32 (1952), Note, 47 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 384 (1952). The psychotherapist there involved was a psychia-
trist, but the rationale of the court would appear applicable to any authorized
psychotherapist. That Illinois has no patient-physician privilege, see Cleary,
Handbook of Illinois Evidence 56 (1956).
13. Of the various bills regulatory of the practice of psychology pend-
ing in the California Legislature at this writing, at least two, A.B. No. 1785,
§ 1805, and A.B. 2712, § 2904, follow the pattern of Georgia, Tennessee,
Arkansas, Kentucky, New York and Washington, in placing the confidential
relations and communications between psychologist and client upon the
same basis as those provided by law between attorney and client. The writer
has been informed that, in addition to California, psychologist certification
or licensure bills are or may be presented in 1957 legislative sessions in
Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Caro-
lina, Pennsylvania, Texas and Wisconsin, and attempts at amendment of the
Connecticut certification law may be made. See note 6 supra.
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significance as the result of the tensions of an increasingly complex
and difficult environment? Is such growth but the function of the in-
credibly rapid increase in the rendition of psychological services?
Or is such growth merely the result of well-integrated efforts on the
part of the organized profession of psychology to achieve for
itself additional professional status? An answer to those
and similar questions is important. The legal profession and
the public should be willing to weigh dispassionately this new
privilege on the scales of principle, measuring the values of the
freedom it promotes against the countervailing need in adjudication
for the kind of information that application of the privilege will pre-
clude. If the privilege is necessary or strongly desirable to fulfill the
needs of psychodiagnostics and psychotherapy, the importance of
these processes to individual well-being would seem to preclude
sacrificing their values to the less frequent and often less cogent
need of judicial administration for disclosure of the communications
in order to get all relevant facts. On the other hand, if the new
privilege is irrationally based and is but the fruit of the professional
ambitions of "newer crafts and professions whose secret com-
munications with their patrons" were not historically privileged,1 4
establishment of the new privilege may do great harm. For the
spawning of spurious privileges can only augment the tendency to
undermine the philosophy of privilege, to the serious loss in this
writer's opinion of personal freedom.
It seems appropriate, therefore, to analyze the strengths and
weaknesses of placing the confidential relations and communications
between a psychologist and his client on the same basis as those
provided by law between attorney and client. The author's conclu-
sion is that because of the multiple and diverse functions currently
performed by psychologists, according confidentiality to clients of
psychologists as such is unwarranted. On the other hand, clients of
psychologists functioning in certain capacities, especially patients
of the psychologist psychodiagnostician and psychotherapist, should
be entitled to the privilege of confidential communication.
Of course, from the self-centered viewpoint of professional
prestige and pride characterized by Shakow as "familiocentrism"' a
-the viewpoint that emphasizes "real or fancied shelter or prestige
to special groups of [professional] people" 10-there can be little
14. See McCormick, Evidence § 81 at 165 (1954), cf. Wiener, Sonic
Legislative and Legal Problems of Psychologists, 8 Am. Psychologist 564
(1953)
15. Shakow, op. cit. supra note **, at 383.
16. See McCormick, Evidence § 81 at 165 (1954).
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doubt that the six statutory provisions obtain for the profession of
psychology the maximal confidentiality in relations with clients
known to our legal system. While confidentiality of spousal"7 and
penitent-dergymen communications' 8 was probably recognized at
common law, it is clear that confidentiality existed for client-attorney
communications' 9 just as it is clear that it did not exist for patient-
physician commumcatons.20 State statutes on client-attorney com-
munications are only declarative and definitive of a privilege deeply
rooted in our legal system and social fabric long prior to such
statutes.2' Therefore if the new privilege be viewed as the objective
of organized psychology sought for reasons of professional prestige,
there can be no doubt that so far as statutory law is concerned the pro-
fession has already achieved its objective in Kentucky, Georgia,
Tennessee, Arkansas, Washington and New York.-- But if this
were the true or principal reason for the new privilege, the public
would be confronted with a spurious privilege which ought to be
resisted. However, as will be developed later, it is believed that there
is a sound rationale and sociological and moral need for a prop-
erly defined privilege for the patients of certain psychologists, espe-
cially those functioning as psychodiagnosticians and psychothera-
pists.
It seems dear that the six mentioned states, in placing the new
privilege on the same basis as that for client-attorney communica-
tions, have achieved at least the virtue of relative simplicity of defi-
nition. The client-attorney privilege is of ancient lineage with wide-
spread if not universal acceptance at least in the Anglo-American
17 Best, Evidence § 586 (12th ed. 1922), 8 Wigniore § 2333, cf. Mc-
Cormi6k, Evidence § 82 (1954).
18. See Cook v. Carroll, [1945] I.R. 515, Regina v. Hay, 2 F & F 4,
175 Eng. Rep. 933, n. (a) (N.P 1860), B~st, Evidence § 584 (12th ed. 1922),
c.McCormick, Evidence § 81 at 166 (1954). Wigmore regarded as open to
argument whether this privilege was recognized in common law courts during
the period before the Restoration, but concluded that since the Restoration it
has been denied in English courts. 8 Wigmore § 2394. However, he also con-
cluded that his four conditions of legitimate privilege exist in this case and
the privilege should be recognized. Id. § 2396.
19. "8 Wigmore § 2290.
20. McCormick, Evidence § 101 (1954), 8 Wigmore § 2380.
21. The rationale of the privilege, however, has undergone evolution. The
earlier emphasis on the oath and the honor of the attorney, see McCormick,
Evidence § 91 (1954) -8 Wignore § 2290, has given way to emphasis on the
necessity of the privilege to induce full disclosure by the client so as to make
possible proper functioning by the attorney. McCormick, Evidence § 91
(1954) , 8 Wigmore § 2291. This justification has been cogently attacked in
an incisive analysis. Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstruclions to Expert
Testimony by Rules of Evidence, 10 U. Chi. L. Rev. 285, 288-90 (1943). For
the present author's analysis of the rationale of this privilege, summarized in
note 46 infra, see Lomsell, supra note 2, at 107
22. See notes 5 and 6 supra.
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legal world, and has been so often construed and applied that there
is a well-established body of doctrine available for assimilation to
the new privilege. When one considers the large number of decisions
which have characterized the evolution of the client-attorney
privilege, the desires of formulators of a new privilege to reap
the fruits of battles fought and victories won, rather to invite new
warfare by generalized statement of principle, are quite under-
standable. Further, blanketing the clients of psychologists as such-:'
23. The six statutes according privilege to client-psychologist con-
fidential relations and communications specify "psychologists," for purpose
of the privilege, as those licensed or certified, as the case may be, under
the applicable statute. e.g., Arkansas, "licensed psychologist" (also includes
"psychological examiner"), Ark. Stat. Ann. § 72-1516 (Supp. 1955) , Georgia,
"licensed applied psychologist," Ga. Code. Ann. § 84-3118 (1955), Kentucky,
"certified clinical psychologist," Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 319.110 1955) , New
York, "psychologist registered under the provisions of this act,' N.Y. Educ.
Law § 7611, Tennessee, "licensed psychologist" (also includes "psychological
examiner"), Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1117 (1955) Washington, "certified psy-
chologist," Wash. Rev. Code § 18.83.110 (1955). Thus the "psychologist'
within the ambit of the confidential communication privilege is he who is a
"psychologist" within the definition provision of the statute. In the New York
statute (a certification type statute, see note 5 supra) appears this definition
"A person represents himself to be a 'psychologist' when he holds himself out
to the public by any title or description of services incorporating the words
'psychological,' 'psychologist' or 'psychology,' and under such title or descrip-
tion offers to render or renders services to individuals, corporations, or the
public for remuneration." N.Y. Educ. Law § 7601 (2). It would seem that
all types of psychologists, including, e.g., industrial psychologists, are coin-
prised within this definition and are registrable under the act, and therefore
since the privilege of confidential communication is given to clients of all
registered psychologists, the client of the registered industrial psychologist is
given the privilege. However, it is possible that under § 7605 of the act per-
taining to qualifications of examinees for certification, administrative officials
might so limit acceptable degrees or educational institutions as to exclude
certain types of psychologists from certification. The Tennessee and Arkansas
licensure definitions (see note 5 supra) of the "practice of psychology" are
given at the beginning of the text, and Kentucky's and Georgia's definitions
are similar. See note 3 supra. In view of the phraseology of these licensure
definitions, it may technically be arguable, under such canons as expressio
unius est exclusto altertits, or possibly ejusdem generis, that they exclude
certain types of psychologists, e.g., industrial psychologists, and hence that
the clients of such psychologists are not given the privilege. See Newman
and Surrey, Legislation. Cases and Materials 654-55 (1955) , 2 Sutherland,
Statutory Construction §§ 4909-4917 (3d ed. Horack, 1943). But likely,
finical interpretive techniques judicially would be subordinated to realistic
ascertainment of the intention of the statutes which would be deemed to coni-
prehend all psychologists.
The difficulty inherent in attempts to define that portion of psychological
practice which generally coincides most closely with psychiatry, namely,
clinical psychology, see note ** supra, is well put in the famous imaginary
dialogue between a psychiatrist and psychologist in Shakow, Psychology and
Psychiatry- A Dialogue, Part 1, 19 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 191, 195 1949).
PSYCHIAnUST" Would you tell me just which group ["clinical psycholo-
gists"] that is? I must confess that I am often puzzled by what you
psychologists mean when you talk about clinical psychology. Some-
times you seem clearly to mean the psychology that is practiced in
medical or, more specifically, psychiatric institutions. Then again,
I hear of clinical psychology in public schools, in reformatorteq, in
[Vol. 41.731
1957] PSYCHOLOGIST IA TODAY'S LEGAL WORLD 739
within the scope of the privilege helps to avoid the perplexing
definitional problems which would ensue -from a statute granting
or withholding privilege according to the function performed by
the psychologst.2 4 But the problem of recognition of a new privilege
is too important to be resolved exclusively or primarily by con-
siderations of ease of definition, especially in view of the danger to
all privilege of undue extension of confidentiality. If the result is to
achieve a privilege more soundly based in a justifying rationale,
even though more difficult of definition, it is far better to face up to
hard definitional problems and resolve them as well as possible.
Against the virtue, then, of relative simplicity of definition of
the new privilege by the siX mentioned states,2 5 must be balanced
whatever undesirable features inhere in placing client-psychologist
relations and communications on the same basis as those of client-
attorney. It is believed that according a privilege to the client of the
psychologist qua psychologist, (1) may result in the anomaly of
wrongly failing to give the privilege in certain relations (patient-
psychiatrist) identic in essential attributes to privileged client-
psychologist relations, (2) discriminatorily grants the privilege
in certain client-psy6hologist relations while not granting it in
industry-m places where there is no medical contact or, at least,
where medical relationships are at a mimmum. What do you really
mean?
PSYCHOLOGIST- I can understand your puzzlement, since psychologists
themselves are vague about the boundaries of this field and in some
respects divided about its inclusiveness. Some hold that clinical psy-
chology should be limited to psychology in medical settings; others
hold that it involves a much broader area and includes all work
where the problems of individual adjustment are the primary con-
cern. When one comes right down to it, however, there is not so
much difference of opinion as at first appears. Actually there is more
confusion about the issues that are involved than true difference of
of opinion about the range of activity. The difficulty seems to arise
from not distinguishing clearly between the content of the training
for the field, and the range of ultimate practice in the field.
See also Note, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 474, 488-91 (1951).
In addition to the ten states presently known to have psychologist
licensure or certification acts, see notes 3-6 .supra, and Montana, see note 6
supra, Oklahoma in its Healing Arts Act regulatory of the practice of psy-
chotherapy definies "qualified psychologist" Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 59, § 731.1 (e)(1949). For a discussion of this law, see Note, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 474, 480
(1951).
24. Although the client-attorney privilege is of ancient lineage and widely
accepted, see, e.g., Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication be-
tween Lawyer and Client, 16 Cal. L. Rev. 487 (192-9), and has engendered a
multitude of interpretive decisions, it still occasions definitional problems,
e.g., Prichard v. United States, 181 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1950), aff'd, 339 U.S.
974 (1950) (denying confidentiality to communications to a judge, who
thought he might give solicited legal advice and then withdraw from any
case involving the advice which might result from pending grand jury
investigations).
25. See notes 5 and 6 supra.
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substantially equivalent client relations with non-psychologists,
without rational basis for the distinction, and (3) grants the
privilege in respect of certain functions performed by psychologists
which should not be privileged. Each of these defects will now be
examined.
(1) While patient-physician communications clearly were not
privileged at common law,2" nearly two-thirds of the states by
statute 7 have accepted the privilege with varying qualificationi,
exceptions and waiver provisions. "8 But, seventeen states, including
Georgia and Tennessee, have refused to adopt this privilege.20
Assuming for purposes of analysis the correctness of Wigmore's
famous four conditions of legitimate privilege,30 and his resultant
conclusion that the American statutory enactments of patient-
physician privilege are unsound and unjustified, 3' it nevertheless
seems clear that not all patient-physicians communications are
legitimately classified in the same category As this writer pointed
out,32 communications to an orthopedic surgeon, for example, are
26. See note 20 supra.
27 8 Wigmore § 2380 n. 5, Note, 47 Nw. U. L. Rev. 384, 385 n. 7
(1952).
28. E.g., in California the privilege is applicable only in civil cases, Cal.
Code Civ. Proc. Ann. (Evid.) § 1881(4) (Deering 1953), People v. West,
106 Cal. 89, 39 Pac. 207 (1895), People v. Dutton, 62 Cal. App. 2d 862, 864,
145 P.2d 676 (1944). Even in jurisdictions where the privilege is generally
acknowledged, it gives wqy to various statutory exceptions. E.g., Minn. Stat.
§ 626.52 (1953) (obligation on physician to report bullet wounds treated by
him) , id. at §§ 618.09, 618.17 (physicians' narcotic records, including names
of patients, open to narcotic enforcement officers) , id. at §§ 144.159, 144.164
(physicians' obligation to file birth, death and still-birth certificates) , id. at§§ 144.42, 144.46 (physicians' obligation to report tuberculosis) , id. at §
257.30; (physicians' obligation to testify as to pregnancy of patient without
her consent in illegitimacy proceedings) , see 8 Wigmore §§ 2380, 2385a.
Illustrative of modern provisions for waiver, particularly significant in per-
sonal injury litigation, are Fed. R. Civ. P 35(b) , Minn. R. Civ. P 35.02. See
Doll v. Scandrett, 201 Minn. 316, 276 N.W 281 (1937) (privilege waived
as to both doctors who conducted a unitary examination of plaintiff when
plaintiff called one as a witness) , 8 Wigmore §§ 2388, 2389, 2390. Construc-
tion of the statutory concept of "physician and surgeon" is often restrictive.
E.g., William Laurie Co. v. McCullough, 174 Ind. 477, 90 N.E. 1014 (1910)(orthopedist without physician's license not within privilege), Robb v. Heath-
erly, 119 Cal. App. 404, 6 P.2d 576 (1931) (Christian Science practitioner
not a physician or surgeon for privilege purposes).
29. McCormick, Evidence § 101 n. 5 (1954).
30. "(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed, (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential
to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties,(3) The relation must be one which in the opinioi of the community ought
to be sedulously fostered, and (4) The mjury that would inure to the rela-
tion by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." 8 Wigmore § 2285.
31. 8 Wigmore § 2380a.
32. Louisell, Confidentiality, Con!orinitv and Confusion. Privileges $I
Federal Court Today, 31 Tul. L. Rev. 101, 108 n. 39 (1956).
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normally quite a different thing by nature than communications to
a psychiatrist. The psycuatrist's patient, or for that matter the
patient of the medical internist or even of the general medical prac-
titioner functioning in psychosomatic medicine, may well be entitled
to the privilege of confidentiality even on the assumption that a
general patient-physician privilege is unwarranted.33 In any event,
certainly a psychiatrist's patient is entitled to confidentiality if a
similarly situated patient of a psychologist is entitled to it. But the
universal adoption in the United States of the client-psychologist
privilege in terms of the New York or five other similar statutes
would in some states produce the anomaly of statutory recogm-
tion of privilege for the psychologist's patient along with its non-
recognition for the similarly situated psychiatrist's patient. Indeed,
this is the situation which apparently now exists in Georgia and
Tennessee, where client-psychologist communications have the
confidentiality accorded client-attorney communications " and where,
because there is no statute privileging patient-physician communica-
tons, the common law rule denying privilege presumably prevails."
The anomaly of statutory recognition of privilege for the psy-
chologist's patient and non-recognition for the psychiatrist's patient
might lead courts increasingly to follow the path of the Illinois court
in spelling out, independently of statute, a privilege for all patients
of psychotherapists, and thus protect the psychiatrist's patient and
practically mitigate the statutory incongruity. But this is speculative
and in any event no justification can be perceived for creating the
incongruity in the first place. While this statutory incongruity would
apparently have full-fledged significance only in states such as
Georgia and Tennessee which continued to refuse privilege to
patient-psychiatrist communications (because not recognizing a
patient-physician privilege) while according it to client-psychologist
communications, it would be felt in varying degrees elsewhere. This
is because the patient-physician privilege statutes, which embrace
psyciatrists as licensed physicians, are generally subject to varying
limitations and restrictions productive of a net result often much less
protective of confidentiality than the client-attorney privilege. Thus,
for example, if Califorma 36 were to adopt the New York provision
33. See Note, 47 Nw. U. L. Rev. 384 (1952).
.34. See Note 5 supra. On the client-attorney privilege, see Ga. Code §§
9-601, 38-418, 38-419, 38-1605 (1933), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-305, 29-307(1955) , see note 29 supra; cf. Guttnacher and Weihofen, supra note 12, at 36.
35. For the distinction between "psychiatrist" and "psychologist," see
note ** supra. In states having a statutory patient-physician privilege, the
patient of a psychuatrist, which psychiatrist is a licensed physician, has the
privilege to the extent that the patient of any other physician has it.
36. See note 13 supra.
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for confidentiality for clients of psychologists, the anomaly would
exist whereby the client of the psychologist would have a privilege
equal to that of the attorney's client which is applicable in both civil
and criminal cases, whereas there is no patient-physician privilege
at all in criminal cases in California.3 7
(2) Under the New York statute and similar statutes, communim-
cations to a psychologist are per se privileged because of his status
as a licensed, registered or certified psychologist.38 But there is no
privilege for the client of the non-psychologist even when he is
performing functions akin to certain of the psychologist's functions,
e.g., marriage counseling or other counseling. Certain of the ap-
proved functions of non-psychologist social workers would seem to
be sufficiently similar to corresponding functions of psychologists
as to justify the privilege for clients of the former if it exists for
those of the latter.39 Perhaps, despite the current deprecation of the
philosophy of confidentiality, 4 a clearly defined privilege for clients
of certain social workers and of other counsellors not within the
ambit of any presently recognized privilege, would be in the public
interest. If so, it would seem that such a privilege should be defined
as precisely as possible in terms of the function performed or service
rendered, and not arbitrarily be accorded or withheld solely on the
basis of whether the professional person involved happens to be a
licensed, registered or certified psychologist. 41
(3) On the other hand, society cannot afford to subordinate the
needs of judicial administration to a never-ending expansion of con-
fidential communication privileges to embrace a multitude of addi-
tional relationships. It is therefore important to limit as precisely as
possible the creation of new privileges to those relationships for
37 See note 28 supra, City and County of San Francisco v. Superior
Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951).
38. See note 23 supra.
39. See Mariano, Psychological Counseling and Its Relationship with
Domestic Relations Law pasumr (1952), Ungar, Privilege and the Mar-
riage Counsellor, 5 Brooklyn Barr.. 49 (1953), cf. Bridgman, The Lawyer
and the Marriage Counselor, 4 Kan. L. Rev. 546 1956), but cf. Vanderbilt,
Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration 344 (1949) For a case study
illustrative of the social worker's procurement of confidential data, see
Rose, The Social Scientist as an Expert Witness, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 205,
209-12 (1956).
40. See note 2 supra.
41. It is arguable that a professional practitioner's status as a licensee
of the state per se has significance on whether confidentiality should be ac-
corded, because such status may enhance the public's reasonable expectations
of confidentiality. This would seem to be a consideration urging the licensing
of those social workers whose functions deserving of confidentiality coincide
with licensed psychologists' functions. But cf. Gellhorn, Individual Freedom
and Governmental Restraints 105 (1956).
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which confidentiality is rationally necessary or strongly desirable.
There would seem to be neither need nor justification for confiden-
tiality in connection with certain functions performed by some psy-
chologists. Why, for example, should the client of an industrial
psychologist, or ot a psychologist engaged in polling public opinion,
have the privilege of confidential communication? Yet the New
York and Washington statutes42 seem broad enough to embrace all
certified psychologists, and the Georgia, Tennessee, Arkansas and
Kentucky statutes43 seem broad enough to embrace all licensed psy-
chologists.4 4
However, the most significant criticism of the six statutes is
probably that the nature of the client-attorney relationship is so
different from that of the client-psychologist relationship as to make
equating the two for purposes of privileges unrealistic and unwar-
ranted. The justification most often advanced for the client-attorney
privilege is the need, for proper fulfillment of the relationship, of
frank and complete disclosure by the client to his attorney, and the
necessity of confidentiality to induce such disclosure. 4' Doubtless
complete disclosure is often also needed in the client-psychologist
relationship, but in the practice of psychology, broadly defined, the
necessity of confidentiality to promote such disclosure is not as per-
vasive and often probably not as cogent as in the client-attorney
relationship. Certain, perhaps many, of the problems for which psy-
chologists' clients seek aid may involve no inhibitions, theoretical
or practical, against disclosure of all of the facts by them to their
psychologists. Tis would seem normally to be true, for example,
of the typical relations between clients and their industrial psychol-
ogists. But the attorney's client is typically in trouble or in reason-
able apprehension thereof and correspondingly feels in need of a
confidentiality certain to withstand all intrusion, especially from the
state.
4 6
42. See note 6 supra.
43. See note 5 supra.
44. See note 23 supra. The mischief criticised in this paragraph of the
text in practice may be mitigated considerably by the doctrine, applicable
generally in privileged communication relationships, that confidentiality of
commiumcation is essential to privilege.
45. See McCornuck, Evidence § 91 (1954), but cf. Morgan, Suggested
Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules of Evidence, 10 U.
Cli. L. Rev. 285, 288-90 (1943).
46. It seems to this writer that the raison d'etre of the client-attorney
privilege properly indicates emphasis not so much on the privilege's conduce-
ment to full disclosure to the attorney as on a person's right of privacy in
certain vital human relations, and the correlative obligation of the attorney to
respect the right under sanction of a "sense of treachery" for disclosing con-
fidences. See 8 Wigmore § 2291 at 557, Louisell, supra note 32, at 109-15; cf.
Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 1205, 159 S.W.r2d 291 (1942), Prosser,
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Of course there is no gainsaying that many of the clinical psy-
chologist's patients are in serious trouble growing out of maladjust-
ments or neuroses. This is why the privilege of confidentiality is
favored, as later developed, for those of them undergoing psycho-
diagnosis and psychotherapy Even so, their troubles do not typically
involve, as do those of the attorney's clients, threats of exercise of
the coercive powers of the state, either directly as the prosecutor of
criminal proceedings or less directly as the authoritative adjudicator
of private disputes. It is against state power that the protections of
privacy and confidentiality seem to exert their most significant
sanctions and have been demonstrated historically to be essential
to the adequate protection of freedom.47
Fortunately it seems possible to accord confidentiality to those
client-psychologist relations, the nature of which require or justify
confidentiality for proper fulfillment of the relationship, without
blanketing within the protection all client-psychologist relationships
whether or not they need the privilege. The trouble with the New
York statute and the five other statutes is that the concept "psychol-
ogist" is descriptive of too many functions to justify its use as the
definer of a confidential communication privilege.48
It is therefore submitted that the New York statute and five
similar statutes already enacted are defective in placing the confi-
dential relations and communications between a psychologist and
his client on the same basis as those provided by law between attor-
ney and client. But there is a sound rationale strongly justifying, if
not requiring, confidentiality for client-psychologist communications
in certain of the many types of relationships between them. In brief,
it seems to this writer that the demonstrable need is for confiden-
tiality for communications between a patient and his licensed or
otherwise authorized psychodiagnostician and psychotherapist,
whether the professional practitioner be a medical psychiatrist or a
Law of Torts § 97 (1955) , Donnelly, The Law of Evidence, Privacy and Dis-
closure, 14 La. L. Rev. 361, 365 passom (1954), Warren and Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 196 (1890). Nevertheless the dis-
tinction between client-attorney consultations and many other consultations,
e.g., certain client-psychologist consultations, remains, namely, the former
most frequently are in the context of at least implied threat of adverse ex-
ercise of state power. Indeed, the uniqueness of the client-attorney relation
is emphasized where, as in Anglo-American law, judicial administration is
largely by adversary litigation. A procedural system based on adversary
litigation could hardly function without confidentiality of client-attorney
relations. See Louisell, Discovery and Pre-Trial, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 633
(1952), cf. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), and concurring opinion
of Justice Jackson.
47 See Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty 46 (1951)
48. See note 23 supra.
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non-medical psychologist. This need is well put in Taylor v. United
States -4
In regard to mental patients, the policy behind such a stat-
ute [patient-physician privilege] is particularly clear and strong.
Many physical ailments might be treated with some degree of
effectiveness by a doctor whom the patient did not trust, but a
psychiatrist must have his patient's confidence or he cannot help
hum. 'The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone
else in the world. He exposes to the therapist not only what his
words directly express, he lays bare his entire self, his dreams, his
fantasies, his sins, and his shame. Most patients who undergo
psychotherapy know that this is what will be expected of them,
and that they cannot get help except on that condition. It
would be too much to expect them to do so if they knew that all
they say -and all that the psychiatrist learns from what they
say - may be revealed to the whole world from a witness
stand.'50
A study of the literature of psychodiagnosis (whether psycho-
analysis or otherwise) and psychotherapy sustains the quoted ob-
servations. It has accurately been noted that there is hardly any
situation in the gamut of human relations where one human being
is so much subject to the scrutiny and mercy of another human
being as in the psychodiagnostic and psychotherapeutic relation-
slups.51 Implicit in the nature and processes of psychodiagnosis and
psychotherapy is a profound prying into the most hidden aspects of
personality and character, a prying often productive of disclosure
of secrets theretofore unknown even to the conscious mind of the
patient himself. Sometimes the processes are aided by hypnosis or
drugs, temporarily putting beyond control of the patient all deliber-
ate choice as to the extent, continuation or termination of the
inquiry Obviously disclosure at large of data thus procured might
have the most significant consequences for the reputation and status
of the patient, and typically he is well aware of the potentialities of
disclosure. It is hard to see how the psychodiagnostic and psycho-
therapeutic functions adequately can be carried on in the absence
of a pervading attitude of privacy and confidentiality. Such an attitude
49. 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955), discussed in Note, 4 Kan. L.
Rev. 597 (1956).
50. The quoted portion within this quotation from the court's opinion
was taken by Edgerton, J. from Guttmacher and Weihofen Psychiatry and
the Law 272 (1952). Cf. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954). See, however,
D.C. Code Ann. §14-3-8 (Supp. 1956), which was amended about five months
after the Taylor case was decided so as to exclude privilege for evidence re-
lating to mental competency in criminal trials and proceedings involving the
mental condition of the accused.
51. Collier, The Psychologist and the Psychzatrtst in a Psychological
Clinic, in Krout, op. cit. supra note **, at 75, 83.
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can hardly exist without sure guarantees against disclosure of the pa-
tient's secrets. It seems clear that such guarantees must include organ-
ized society's ultimate safeguard against revelation, namely, privilege
against legally coerced disclosure in all circumstances save that of
voluntary and intelligent waiver of the privilege by its owner, the
patient. 52 It seems accurate to conclude, therefore, that a patient's
right of confidential communication to his psychodiagnostician and
psychotherapist is a function of his right to engage and get help
from such services. If he has a right to obtain such services, he has
a correlative right to the essential confidentiality of comnmnica-
tion.53
It is also submitted that the foregoing conclusions are sound
even on the assumption that Wigmore was correct in rejecting the
patient-physician privilege as such. His famous four conditions of
legitimate privilege14 all appear to be fulfilled in the case of com-
munications to a psychodiagnostician or psychotherapist. The coi-
munication originates in a confidence, the inviolability of that con-
fidence is vital to the achievement of the purposes of the relationship,
the relationship is one that should be fostered, the expected injury
to the relationship, through the fear of later disclosure, is greater
than the expected benefit to judicial administration of forcing breach
of the confidence. 55 A distinction apparently basic, recurrent in the
literature, is well noted in Taylor v. United Slates "Many physical
ailments might be treated with some degree of effectiveness by a
doctor whom the patient did not trust, but a psychiatrist must have
his patient's confidence or he cannot help him.'" '
52. In the case of all of the professional commumcation privileges the
right to the privilege, i.e., the ownership of it, is in the client or lay person,
the correlative obligation of secrecy is on the professional person. McCormick,
Evidence § 73 (1954) , 8 Wigmore § 2196.
53. However appealing the argument for reduction of the conventional
patient-physician privilege so that " the presiding judge may compel
disclosure, if in his opinion the same is necessary to a proper adininstra-
tion of justice," N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-53 (1953) , see McCormick, Evidence §
81 at 166 (1954), Leusink v. O'Donnell, 255 Wis. 627, 632, 39 N.W.2d
675 (1949), it is submitted that in any event such a "discretionary" privilege
is clearly inadequate to the needs of the psychotherapist's patient. See note 56
infra, cf. Shoben, Psychologists and Legality- A Case Report, 5 Am. Psy-
chologist 496 (1950)
54. See note 30 supra.
55. See text accompanying notes 63-67 mifra.
56. 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955). It is cogently argued by Rogers,
A Physician-Pattent or Therapist-Client Relationship? in Krout, op. cit.
supra note ** at 135, 136, that the patient-psychotherapist relationslup differs
essentially from the conventional patient-physician relationship which pre-
vails in those situations which are clearly and almost solely organic. In the
latter, normally the patient is relatively passive and the physician active,
it is the physician's diagnosis and treatment that is all important, it is
secondary or even immaterial whether the patient has any basic understanding
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It must be conceded that rejection of the kind of provision for
confidentiality of the six enacted statutes 7 in favor of the foregoing
rationale justifying privilege only for the patient of the psychodiag-
nostician and psychotherapist has the disadvantage of substituting
for the broad concept "psychologist,"S which because of its com-
prehensiveness tends to preclude problems of interpretation as to
applicability, the narrower concept "psychodiagnosis and psycho-
therapy", which inherently invites interpretation. A judicial attempt
at precise definition of psychodiagnosis and psychotherapy for
purposes of fixing entitlement to the privilege would present a for-
midable task, occasioning perhaps an uncertain and inconclusive
meandering line of interpretation. Distinguishing between psycho-
diagnosis and psychotherapy on the one hand, and certain other
functions performed by psychologists on the other, presents all the
definitional problems of distinguishing between "treating the abnor-
mal" and "counseling the normal." Attempts at distinctions as they
evolved from case to case might produce definitions as relative, hazy
and overlapping as those of "health" and "sickness", "vitality" and
"enervation", "well-being" and "malaise."
It is apparent that no attempt has been made in this article to
define psychodiagnosis or psychotherapy for the purpose of pre-
scribing the conditions of their legitimate practice by the non-
medically trained psychologist. That must await another time. Per-
haps in respect to this problem the hour is so late that one should
not speak at all unless he is willing to name the solution for the
day. This the present writer is still unable to attempt. It is a problem
in the first instance to be threshed out by the medical profession,
particularly its psychiatric branch, and the psychological profession,
and still to be authoritatively threshed out in some localities. This
problem, the resolution of which is vital to the public welfare and
which increasingly engages public interest,59 may represent one of
of the illness or theory or method of cure. But the very art of successful
psychotherapy seems to consist m helping the patient learn for himself the
causes of his conduct and the methods of correction. See also May, The
Work and Training of the Psychological Therapist, in rd. at 161, 170-80. Of
course this distinction is as relative, and involves from a therapy viewpoint
about the same overlap, as that between "mind" and "body." Interestingly illus-
trative of the current flux m emphases as between "psyche" and "soma" is the
fact that while, apparently, "internal medicine turns hopefully to psychology
in tracing etiology (in cardio-vascular, gastro-intestional, genito-urinary,
and other pathologies), psychiatry (which is preeminently psychological) is
veering toward the organic viewpoint." Krout, Cats Psychologists and Py-
chitrtsts Share Their Responsibility to the Public? in id. at 103, 108.
57. See notes 5 and 6 stpra.
58. See note 23 supra.
59. See Psychiatry, Psychology, and the Public Interest pass in (Krout
ed. 1956), Editorial, Psychologists vs. Psychiatrists, 92 America 528 (1955).
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those conflicts of expert opinion which ultimately has to be settled
by non-professional or lay judgment. 0 In the meantime the mher-
ent difficulty of the problem is well put by Shakow in his famous
imaginary dialogue between a psychiatrist and a psychologist .1
PSYCHIATRIST I was going to say last night that of
all the aspects of your training program, the part about which
most questions would arise among psychiatrists is, of course,
that relating to therapy This is the area in which the greatest
conflict exists. One has here all the problems that stem from
traditional medical control of the field -the natural insistence
by the physician that treating the sick person is his prerogative.
PSYCHOLOGIST I recognize the central nature of this prob-
lem in the relationship of the two professions. Some have held
that this crucial question could be solved by defining the 'sick'
person. It is my belief, however, that a satisfactory definition
cannot really be formulated, and even if formulated, it would
not be too helpful. Obviously, the medical man is, by the very
nature of his work, bound to pass over from the problem of
treating disease to the problem of preventing disease, and once
he does that, he necessarily leaves the realm of dealing with the
sick person. When you broaden 'sickness' to include 'potential
sickness' you cover a rather wide territory)
PSYCHIATRIST To say nothing of the problems lying in the
immense borderline area between health and disease. Let's not
even raise the question which has been asked by some, whether
psychological sickness is of the same order as physical sickness.
PSYCHOLOGIST From the psychologist's side the problem,
though different, is also great. The psychologist is interested in
the functioning of the normal organism. He is naturally inter-
ested in the variations in behavior-not only the natural bio-
logical variations, but also the more extreme ones that border
on the pathological. In the final analysis, can we put it any
differently than this Psychologists work from the normal end
of the distribution toward the middle, and psychiatrists work
from the pathological end toward the middle. There is bound to
be a very considerable area of overlap (to a slight degree extend-
ing even to the other extreme), an area of overlap where defini-
tion is not, and cannot be, clear. Is not our major concern with
the development of adequately prepared professional people who
have a care for the needs of the person studied, who are sensitive
to the range of problems in their own field and to the problems
of colleagues in other fields, who are appreciative of social needs,
and who above all possess essential good will? Under such cir-
cumstances couldn't we depend on specific problems being taken
care of satisfactorily as they arise?
It is noteworthy that at least two states already have expressly
embraced psychotherapy within their definitions of the practice of
60. See Note, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 474, 488-91 (1952).
61. Shakow, supra note ** at 381-82.
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psychology. 2 It does seem safe to conclude at this time that to the
extent the psychologist is or may be determined to be an authorized
practitioner of psychodiagnosis and psychotherapy, those of his
patients who invoke his services in those capacities, as well as the
psychiatrist's patients, should be entitled to the privilege of confi-
dential commiumcation.
Recognition of a patient-psychologist privilege even on the lim-
ited basis stated above will hardly find acceptance by those eminent
evidence scholars whose antipathy toward the philosophy of privi-
lege proceeds from a realization of the social importance of accurate
fact finding in litigation, and from their convictions that the values
of confidentiality in practically all relations must be subordinated
to ascertainment of the truth in legal proceedings. 3 But it seems to
this writer, who of course would not deny the social importance of
accurate fact finding, or that full disclosure of relevant facts is im-
portant to complete and fair trials, that too often in contemporary
thmldng there is failure adequately to evaluate the significance to
human freedom of well-based privileges of confidential communica-
tion.64 Mofeover, it seems that there is a tendency to over emphasize
the value to the adjudicative processes of forcing the professional
man to disgorge in court secrets confided to him. Often the commu-
nication pertains to an objective fact, the ascertainment of which if
really important to just decision in a lawsuit, is normally feasible
for a competent and diligent counsel from sources extrinsic to the
communication.6 5 This seems increasingly true with the develop-
ments of modem discovery. 6 The fact of availability of the sought
data from extrinsic sources does not undermine the psychological
and moral importance to the individual of confidentiality of commu-
mcation. The fact that he can talk freely with his professional ad-
viser without enhancing his difficulty or embarrassment remains,
even if he is aware that his predicament may be exposed from extrin-
62. Ark. Stat Ann. § 72-1502(B) (Supp. 1955), Tenn. Code Ann. §
63-1107 (1955). Note, however, the requirement that " The psychologist
or psychological examiner who engages m psychotherapy must establish and
maintain effective inter-communication with a psychologically oriented
physician, usually a psycluatrist, to make provision for the diagnosis and
treatment of medical problems by a physician with an unlimited license to
practice the healing arts in this state. " Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1108 (1955).
Arkansas has a provision substantially the same. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 72-1502
(Supp. 1955).
63. See note 2 supra.
64. See Louisell, =pra note 32, at 107-15.
65. The observation made in respect of the privilege agamst self-
incrimination often seems apposite to confidential communication privileges:
"It is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade [in India] rubbing red
pepper into a poor devil's eyes than to go about in the sun hunting evidence."
Quoted in 8 Wigmore § 2251 at 315.
66. E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37, Minn. R. Civ. P 26-37
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sic sources. Where the communication does not pertain to an obJec-
tive fact ascertainable independently of the communication, but
rather to a subjective mental state relevant in the litigation, it is
true that forcing open the mouth of the spouse, lawyer or psycho-
therapist may be not only a highly convenient aid to accurate fact
finding, but in some instances the sine qua non of discovery of the
full truth. But it is just such situations, where there is lacking the
possibility of objective checks on the truth of testimony, that occa-
sion the gravest temptation to perjury by the holder of the secret.
This is apparently why in the legal thought of a number of European
countries emphasis is placed upon the moral importance of refrain-
ing from coercion of witnesses in matters of conscience.", Such
coercion, in the face of conflicting concepts of loyalty and duty, is
considered to put witnesses in morally intolerable positions, and to
be productive of perjury It seems to this writer that any values to
judicial administration inherent in attempts to force the psycho-
therapist to disgorge the secrets of his patients are over-balanced
by (1) the inducement to perjury implicit in such attempts and
(2) the harm to the human personality, and hence to freedom, in
governmental forcing of a serious conflict of conscience.
Ultimately, the evaluation of the social and moral importance
to human freedom of any confidential communication privilege, in
relation to the significance at a trial of foreclosing ascertainment of
the full facts, involves value judgments, the testing of which, so far
as known to this writer, is presently subject to no scientific tech-
nique. Without gainsaying the importance to the individual in-
volved in litigation of accurate fact ascertainment, it is obvious that
for every such involvment a person typically has numerous rela-
tions - and relations with a psychotherapist are in modern society
increasingly illustrative-wherein confidentiality is promotive of vital
personal interests and therefore important to human freedom. More-
over, when it is the state which may be the opponent of the claimant
to privilege, as in criminal cases, there is no sound reason automatic-
ally to foreclose the issue against such claimant. Such a foreclosure
seems to this writer to be the function of a philosophy which deems
state processes per se valuable and significant and individual interests
per se subordinate, a philosophy whose devastating effects on human
freedom often have been demonstrated by history ancient and recent,
and are being demonstrated today 68 (To be continued)
67 See Louisell, supra note 32 at 101, 109, 110 nn. 43-45, Austrian Code
Civil Procedure §§ 320, 321, cf. Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty 46 (1951).
68. See Connery, The Right to Silence, 39 Marq. L. Rev. 180 (1955-56) ,
ef. Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today 75-76 (1955)
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